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Abstract
Based on a survey of employees in a large telecommunications company, we  examine  the  means
through which privatisation, accompanied by an Employee Share-Ownership Plan (ESOP), impact
on employee commitment and organisational citizenship behaviour.  Findings show that  although
the ESOP has in some way moderated outcomes, privatisation has had negative  consequences  for
commitment.  Despite this, 50  percent  of  respondents  report  an  increased  level  of  citizenship
behaviour.  In determining changes in employee commitment and behaviour, it was found  that  an
important  role  is  played  by  how  employees  perceive  changes  in  conditions  of  employment,
involvement in workplace decision-making and management-union collaboration.
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0Introduction
In the  mid-1990s,  Ireland’s  state-owned  telecommunications  utility,  Telecom  Éireann,
faced a host of challenges as a result of increased  product  market  competition  arising  from  EU
directives on liberalisation and rapid  technological  developments.   A  strategic  business  review
recommended a number  of  issues  to  be  addressed  in  order  to  meet  these  challenges.   These
included reductions in operating costs and the level of debt, improvements in service  quality,  and
international  expansion  through  the  formation  of  strategic  alliances  (Telecom-Éireann  1995).
Among the significant measures adopted following this review was  the  formation  of  a  strategic
alliance with the Scandinavian consortium Comsource[2] in 1996.   This  paved  the  way  for  full
privatisation, which was completed in July  1999  when  the  state’s  remaining  shareholding  was
sold by way of an initial public offer, with the firm being subsequently renamed Eircom.
In the period before  and  after  full  privatisation,  Eircom  underwent  significant  internal
adjustment, including the appointment of new  senior  management  and  the  restructuring  of  the
firm  around  five   market-based   business   units.    Unions   and   management   negotiated   and
implemented a comprehensive reform plan, The  Telecom  Partnership,  which  introduced  a  new
industrial relations partnership structure, reforms  to  current  work  practices,  and  a  labour  cost-
cutting strategy.  Employee and trade union support for  these  reforms  was  contingent  upon  the
establishment  of  an  Employee  Share  Ownership  Plan  (ESOP).   Under  the  ESOP  agreement
employees secured 14.9 percent ownership of  the  firm,  which  in  global  terms  was  the  largest
ESOP in the context of privatisation to date.
The Eircom ESOP Trust,  whose  board  of  directors  is  made-up  of  mainly  trade  union
appointees, was established to hold and administer the shares on behalf of employees and  appoint
representatives to Eircom’s board of directors.  The Trust’s stated aims are to  provide  employees
with financial compensation for supporting  the  implementation  of  firm  reform  and  to  provide
more  effective  representative  participation  in  firm  decision-making.  The  voting  right   which
accompanies its ordinary shareholding has allowed the ESOP to play a key role  in  two  takeovers
of Eircom, which occurred in 2001 and 2006.  The support  of  the  ESOP  was  necessary  for  the
success  of  each  takeover,  and  the  ESOP  has   used   this   position   to   increase   its   ordinary
shareholding to its current level of 35 percent and board-level representation to three directors.
In this paper we measure  the  impact  of  privatisation  and  the  accompanying  ESOP  on
employee commitment and citizen behaviour.   To  elaborate  on  how  strategic  changes  such  as
privatisation  influence  these  key  indicators  of  performance,  we  use  a  large  scale  survey  of
Eircom’s employees.  Our data is used to  examine  how  changes  in  employee  commitment  and
citizen behaviour are determined by perceived changes  in  conditions  of  employment,  employee
participation in firm decision making, and management-union collaboration.
Privatisation, performance and employee share ownership
The privatisation of state owned enterprises is generally expected to create a  shift  in  firm
objectives from those determined by political and social  criteria  to  those  aimed  at  shareholder-
welfare and profit-maximisation.  A number of writers (for example Boycko, et al.  1996;  Vickers
and Yarrow 1988), have adopted the principal-agent paradigm for the  purpose  of  examining  the
nature and impact of such changes in firm objectives.  Principal-agent theory  views  organisations
as  consisting  of  layers  of  principals  and  agents,   whose   relationship   with   one   another   is
characterised  by  bounded  rationality   and   information   asymmetry.    Such   relationships   are
susceptible to problems of opportunism and  moral  hazard,  as  utility  maximising  agents  pursue
their own self-interests, and  may  take  advantage  of  opportunities  or  circumstances  with  little
regard for the interests of the principal (Williamson, et al. 1975).
Agency costs arise due to both the inherent costs of delegating  authority  to  an  agent  and
the transaction costs associated with providing  effective  monitoring  and  incentive  mechanisms.
The key question that arises in the context of privatisation  is  whether  the  change  in  ownership,
and the changes in the various incentives and monitoring mechanisms that accompany it,  succeed
in aligning the objectives of management and shareholders  or  otherwise  curtailing  opportunistic
behaviour (Bos 1986, 1991;  Kay  and  Thompson  1986;  Martin  and  Parker  1997;  Vickers  and
Yarrow  1989).   Following  privatisation,  changes   in   managerial   incentives   and   monitoring
mechanisms can  be  divided  into  those  that  arise  internally  through  shareholder  control  (e.g.
performance related remuneration and share options), and those that  arise  externally  through  the
market mechanism (e.g. product market competition and the threat of bankruptcy or takeover).  To
date, much of the existing empirical literature has focused on the  impact  these  changes  have  on
the principal-agent relationship between shareholders and management, and on outcomes  such  as
firm performance.  This empirical research has however failed to deliver conclusive findings, with
the question of enterprise performance proving an elusive one that depends on a number of critical
factors beyond just ownership such  as  product  market  competition  and  internal  organisational
structure  (Dunsire,  1991).   In  this  paper  we  focus  on  changes  in  the  internal  organisational
structure, examining the relationship between changes that occur at the managerial level and those
that occur at the operational level (Bishop and  Thompson  1992;  Kay  1991;  Martin  and  Parker
1997).
While  the  importance  of  changes   in   firm   strategy   in   determining   the   impact   of
privatisation on firm performance has been investigated (see for example Martin and Parker 1997;
Shleifer  1998)  the  relationship  between  privatisation  and  the  firm’s  work   environment   and
employee  attitudes  and  behaviour  has  received   less   attention   (Haskel   and   Sanchis   1995;
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0Megginson and Netter 2001).  Factors such as trust and reciprocity can play  a  significant  role  in
the principal-agent relationships that exist within the firm.  As agents, employees enter a firm with
certain  needs,  and  the  ability  of  the  firm  and  its  management  (the  principal)  to  provide  an
environment  in  which  they  can  satisfy  these  needs  determines   employee   commitment   and
subsequent  behaviour  (Mowday,  et  al.  1982).    Employee   commitment   can   be   seen   as   a
psychological state that characterises employees’ relationship  with  the  organisation  (Meyer  and
Allen  1997).   It  is  dependent  on  whether  employees   share   common   goals   with   the   firm
(organisational integration), a sense of solidarity with the firm (organisational  involvement)  and
loyalty to the firm (organisational commitment) (Long 1980).  When employees feel that the  firm
is  maintaining  or  improving  their  work  environment,  they  perceive   a   moral   obligation   to
reciprocate through greater levels of commitment and citizenship behaviour (e.g. increased  work-
effort and improved disposition to colleagues) (Coyle-Shapiro and Kessler  2000;  2002).   On  the
other hand, where employees feel the firm has failed to provide a beneficial work  environment  in
exchange for their  work  effort,  it  can  be  expected  that  employees  will  reduce  their  level  of
commitment and citizenship behaviour.
Figure  1  outlines  the  mechanism  through  which   privatisation   and   employee   share-
ownership  can  be  expected  to  impact  on  employee  commitment  and  citizen  behaviour.   By
focusing firm objectives on profitability and competitiveness, privatisation can have  a  significant
impact on the strategies adopted by management.  Changes in firm strategy can  take  the  form  of
rationalisation aimed at reducing excess labour costs, changes in employee work-patterns aimed at
improving labour performance, and changes in governance structures with  the  aim  of  improving
supervision and organisational flexibility.  In effect, this leads to a significant  realignment  of  the
employee relationship as features traditionally associated with public sector employment (e.g.  job
security, promotion based on length of tenure and a stable work environment) no longer prevail  in
the  more  commercial  environment  associated  with  private  ownership.   Such  changes  can  be
expected to increase employee turnover and have a negative impact on employee commitment and
citizen behaviour.
Figure.1 Conceptual framework
An important feature of many divestitures is the allocation of significant  shareholdings  to
employees.  In the context of Irish privatisation, representative share-ownership of  approximately
14.9 percent has been used to facilitate employee and trade union support for  firm  rationalisation
and reform.  Such significant share-ownership, as well  as  providing  employees  with  a  form  of
financial compensation for the adverse  consequences  of  privatisation,  can  also  be  expected  to
provide employees with an effective financial incentive and a real sense of ownership and  control
in firm decision-making (Klein 1987).  Therefore, where  privatisation  can  be  expected  to  have
adverse  affects  on  employee  commitment  and  behaviour  by  increasing  agency   costs,   share
ownership  can  be  expected  to  counterbalance  these  increased  agency  costs  by  aligning   the
objectives of employees with other shareholders and providing employees with a financial stake in
the firm.  This gives rise to the first hypothesis that will be examined in this paper:
Hypothesis 1:  Perceptions of commitment and citizenship behaviour will be  more  positive  when
linked to the establishment of the ESOP than privatisation
In order to further explore the mechanism through which privatisation and employee share-
ownership influence employee commitment  and  performance,  it  is  necessary  to  examine  their
impact on employees’ immediate work environment.  In this paper, we focus  on  three  aspects  of
the work environment, including conditions of employment, levels  of  employee  participation  in
firm decision-making, and the level of management-union collaboration.  Each of these aspects  is
influenced significantly by both privatisation and employee  share-ownership,  and  each  can  also
act as significant antecedents for employee commitment and behaviour.
Employment conditions, commitment and citizenship behaviour
Due to a lack of effective product  market  competition,  high  levels  of  unionisation,  and
political intervention, public sector enterprises  are  commonly  associated  with  overstaffing  and
wage premiums (Boycko, et al. 1996; Florio 2004).  In the period surrounding privatisation,  firms
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earnings premium (see for example Brown, et al. 2006; Haskel and Szymanski 1991; La porta and
Lopez-de-Silones 1999; Parker and Martin 1996).   Public  sector  firms  are  also  associated  with
high levels of employment security, rigid wage structures, and the use of formal  work  procedures
and  practices.   Following  privatisation,  with  the  aim  of  securing   long-term   efficiency   and
increased productivity, firms may significantly change employee work-patterns or  introduce  high
performance work mechanisms (Ferner and Colling 1991).  Resulting changes, such  as  increased
workload and reduced job security, can have a direct and often negative impact on how employees
perceive changes in their conditions of employment, especially where employees have made large
non-diversifiable investments in their human capital.
The establishment of an ESOP, by  creating  employee  shareholders,  can  be  expected  to
align  the  objectives  of  employees  and   management,   thereby   facilitating   greater   employee
understanding in relation to  changes  in  conditions  of  employment.   Where  employees  receive
shares free of charge or at a discounted price, an ESOP can also be viewed as a  form  of  financial
compensation in light of these reforms.  Furthermore, the ESOP may  allow  employees  and  their
representatives to oppose adverse changes in conditions of employment.  By providing employees
and  their  representatives   with   ownership   rights,   including   voting   rights   and   board-level
representation, an ESOP may place management under pressure to refrain from the introduction of
measures that have a negative impact on employee welfare.
Conditions of employment, especially those that impact on an employee’s immediate work
environment (e.g. pay and hours worked), can have a significant impact on employee commitment
and behaviour.  Where employees feel management have allowed  conditions  to  deteriorate  as  a
result of privatisation,  they  can  be  expected  to  reciprocate  through  reduced  commitment  and
performance (Coyle-Shapiro and Kessler 2000).   However,  where  the  ESOP  has  succeeded  in
opposing adverse  reforms  or  has  provided  employees  with  sufficient  financial  compensation,
reductions in commitment and performance may be significantly  reduced.   This  leads  us  to  our
second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2:  Perceived improvements (deterioration) in working conditions  will  be  associated
with higher (lower) levels of commitment and citizen behaviour.
Employee participation, commitment and citizenship behaviour
Public  sector   firms   are   typically   characterised   by   rigid   pyramid-style   managerial
structures,   functional   department   structures,   and   a   centralised    decision-making    process.
Privatisation often involves a reduction in the number of managerial layers, the decentralisation of
decision-making authority, and the establishment of  market-based  business  units  (Erakovic  and
Wilson 2006; O’Connell Davidson 1993).  Such  reforms,  through  the  creation  of  more  clearly
defined and quantifiable performance targets, provide lower level managers  with  an  incentive  to
more closely supervise and control employee decisions.  This may result  in  reducing  employees’
sense of participation in decision-making, particularly at the workplace  level.   In  the  context  of
Irish  privatisation,  the  removal  of  statutory  public  sector  worker  directors[3]  can  also  be   a
significant factor in reducing employees’ sense  of  participation  post-privatisation.   Privatisation
also  affects  the  ability  of  trade  unions  to  provide  an  effective  voice  of  employee   opinion.
Management can be expected to adopt a harder line with trade unions as  they  seek  to  implement
firm restructuring during the privatisation process.  The  need  to  improve  firm  performance  and
protect  market  share  also  provides  management  with  more  effective  bargaining  tools,  while
reduced political involvement undermines the ability of unions  to  use  their  status  as  a  political
interest group to oppose  reform  (see  for  example  Arrowsmith  2003;  Ferner  1998;  O’Connell
Davidson 1993; Pendleton 1994, 1999).
Share-ownership, on the other hand, can be seen as a means of  creating  greater  employee
participation  in  firm  decision-making.   Much  of  the  existing  literature  on   employee   share-
ownership focuses on the instrumental satisfaction model,  which  emphasises  the  importance  of
share-ownership being accompanied by employees  experiencing  a  genuine  sense  of  ownership
and control (see  for  example  Ben-Ner  and  Jones  1995;  Klein  1987;  Pendleton,  et  al.  1998).
Where an ESOP is representative in  nature,  increased  levels  of  employee  participation  can  be
achieved through the use of employee ownership rights (i.e. right to vote and appoint directors), or
by providing trade unions with  a  new  role  within  the  firm  as  the  representatives  of  not  only
employees but shareholders.   As  a  result,  the  establishment  of  an  ESOP  can  be  expected  to
counterbalance the loss of union bargaining strength associated with privatisation, and  to  provide
employees with a greater sense of participation in firm decision-making, particularly  at  the  firm-
level.
Similar  to  changes  in  conditions   of   employment,   perceived   changes   in   employee
participation  in  firm  decision-making  can  be  expected  to  have  a  positive   relationship   with
employee commitment and citizenship behaviour.  Furthermore, privatisation and employee-share
ownership can be expected to  have  opposing  influences  on  employees’  sense  of  participation.
This leads to hypothesis 3:
Hypothesis 3:     Perceptions of increased (decreased) levels of employee participation  will  be  associated
with higher (lower) levels of commitment and citizenship behaviour.
Management-union collaboration, commitment and citizenship behaviour
The rigid governance structures that exist in many public sector firms can also be reflected
in the firm’s industrial relations structures, which are often characterised by centralised bargaining
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0and elaborate  procedures  (Pendleton  1997).   As  management  seeks  to  introduce  reforms  and
overcome union opposition,  privatisation  can  be  expected  to  result  in  the  decentralisation  of
bargaining structures and  the  imposition  of  more  flexible  procedures.   Yet  in  many  cases  of
privatisation the research shows that contrary  to  expectations  existing  bargaining  structures  are
often  maintained  following  privatisation  (see  for  example  Arrowsmith   2003;   Ferner   1998;
O’Connell  Davidson  1993;  Pendleton   1999).    This   indicates   that   both   trade   unions   and
management adopt a more pragmatic approach.  Management identify trade union  cooperation  as
a  means  of  securing  employee  acceptance  for  reform,  and  thus  avoiding  industrial  conflict.
Unions recognise  the  need  to  engage  effectively  with  management  in  order  to  influence  the
outcome of reforms and minimise the adverse consequences for their members.   A  representative
ESOP  involves  the   exchange   of   financial   information   and   the   establishment   of   formal
collaborative structures between management and the ESOP Trust, which is  dominated  by  union
appointees.  Along with establishing such collaborative structures, by providing employees with  a
financial stake in the firm, ESOPs can also create a common ground upon which management and
unions can engage with one another.
As effective management-union collaboration is an important mechanism  for  determining
employee welfare and it can be expected that perceptions of management-union collaboration will
be positively associated with commitment and  citizenship  behaviour  (Gordon  and  Ladd  1990).
This leads us to hypothesis 4.
Hypothesis 4:  Perceptions  of  increased  (decreased)  management-union  collaboration  will  be
associated with higher (lower) levels of commitment and citizenship behaviour.
Methodology
In order to test these hypotheses, a survey was distributed among  a  representative  sample
of employees at Eircom.  The survey, covering employee perceptions of  the  impact  privatisation
and the ESOP has on their work environment and performance, was distributed  with  the  support
of both firm management and trade unions.  A stratified sampling approach was adopted, dividing
employees by geographical region and business area.  The survey was  run  in  February  of  2007,
over seven years after full privatisation, and received a final response rate of close to 70 percent (n
= 711).  Specifically, the survey sought data in relation to the following variables.
Data
Independent/antecedent variables
As privatisation and the introduction  of  the  ESOP  occurred  simultaneously,  it  was  not
possible  to  establish  separate  measures  regarding  their  impact  on  each   of   the   independent
variables (see appendix 1 for a description of the  independent  variables).   The  data  gathered  in
relation to the independent variables covered the following:
Perceived changes in conditions of employment (Cond): employees were presented  with  a
list of nine conditions of employment.   These  included  items  relating  to  job  security,  working
hours, remuneration, training, and work-patterns.   Respondents  indicated  the  degree  of  change
since privatisation and  the  introduction  of  the  ESOP  on  a  seven-point  scale  from  ‘increased
significantly’ to ‘decreased significantly’.
Perceived  changes  in  employee   participation   in   firm   decision-making:   employees’
perceptions regarding changes in their influence over operational and  departmental/strategic-level
decision-making  were  both  assessed.   Respondents  indicated  their  level   of   participation   in
decisions affecting nine items on a seven-point scale from ‘much more  say’  to  ‘much  less  say’.
Four items related to participation at the operational  level  (OpPart),  while  five  items  related  to
departmental and strategic-level issues (StratPart).
Perceived changes in management-union collaboration (Collab): employees reported their
level of  agreement  with  eight  statements  relating  to  changes  in  management-union  relations.
Employees were presented with a seven-point scale from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’.
Dependent variables
Changes in employee commitment since privatisation  (PsnCom)  and  the  introduction  of
the  ESOP  (ESOPCom):  employees  were  presented   with   six   statements   referring   to   their
attachment to, identification with, and involvement  in  the  organisation.   Of  the  six  statements,
three referred to changes since privatisation and three referred to changes since the introduction of
the ESOP (see table 1).
Changes in employee organisational citizen behaviour since  privatisation  (PsnOCB)  and
the  introduction  of  the  ESOP  (ESOPOCB):  employees  were  presented  with   six   statements
referring to their willingness  to  help  co-workers,  work  beyond  assigned  duties,  and  remain  a
member of the firm.  Again, the six statements were divided into changes  since  privatisation  and
the establishment of the ESOP (see table 3). Each of the above measures  was  based  on  a  seven-
point scale from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’.
The data was analysed using OLS regression and Appendix 2 shows  descriptive  statistics,
0
0reliability measures, and a correlation matrix for each variable.   The  reliability  of  each  measure
was  assessed  using   Cronbach’s   Alpha   (?),   with   all   measures   having   values   above   the
recommended  level  of  0.7.   The  correlation  matrix  shows  a  significant  level   of   correlation
between the independent variables operational and strategic-level employee participation (r = .60).
 As a result, separate regression  analyses  were  conducted  using  operational  and  strategic-level
participation as predictor variables.
As prior research has demonstrated that attitudes and behaviour at work can be  influenced
by demographic characteristics, a number of control  variables  were  included  in  the  analysis  to
reduce the possibility of finding spurious relationships.  Control variables were  formed  based  on
the business area in which employees  work[4]  (Retail  and  Other),  employee  gender  (Gender),
ESOP  membership  (ESOP),  and  the  number  of  years  employees  have   worked   for   Eircom
(Tenure).  It should be noted that only a limited number of respondents were not  members  of  the
ESOP, and as such results regarding this variable should be treated with caution[5].
Findings
Organisation commitment
Trends in employee commitment since privatisation and the establishment of the ESOP are
reported in table 1. It appears that broadly similar questions  elicit  different  responses  depending
on whether the context is privatisation or the ESOP.  The findings in relation  to  privatisation  are
strikingly negative with a mean total (3 items combined) of  17  percent  of  respondents  agreeing
that  commitment  has   increased   since   privatisation,   while   66   percent   disagree   with   this
proposition.  On the other hand, the  ESOP  has  had  a  more  positive,  although  not  particularly
strong impact on employee attitudes.  On average (3 items combined)  42  percent  of  respondents
indicated that  commitment  increased  since  the  establishment  of  the  ESOP,  while  38  percent
disagreed.  In the context of general propositions in relation to ESOPs, it  is  somewhat  surprising
that, aside from the measure of loyalty, less than half of the sample  reported  positive  changes  in
commitment.   Although  the  ESOP  does  appear  to  have  had  a  positive   effect   in   terms   of
moderating the negative impact of privatisation on employee commitment, this  moderating  effect
has been limited.  These initial findings provide support for hypothesis 1, under which perceptions
of commitment were expected to be more positive when linked to the establishment of the  ESOP,
as  opposed  to  privatisation.   This  may  be  due  to  the  ESOP  being   associated   with   greater
improvements  in  employee  welfare  (e.g.  financial   returns,   improved   union   and   employee
participation, and greater alignment  of  employee  and  shareholder  interests)  than  privatisation,
which is associated with reductions in employee welfare (e.g. reduced job  security  and  pay,  and
increased supervision and workload).
Table 1: Changes in employee commitment
|                                                    |Agree    |Neither   |Disagree   |
|                                                    |(1-3)    |(4)       |(5-7)      |
|Items                                               |%        |%         |%          |
|Since privatisation, employees feel…                |         |          |           |
|…there is a reduced gap between their welfare and   |10       |16        |74         |
|that of Eircom*                                     |14       |18        |68         |
|…that they have become more important members of    |26       |17        |57         |
|this firm                                           |         |          |           |
|…less inclined to leave Eircom if offered a similar |17       |17        |66         |
|job elsewhere*                                      |         |          |           |
|                                                    |         |          |           |
|Mean 3 items                                        |44       |17        |39         |
|                                                    |27       |19        |54         |
|Since the ESOP, employees feel…                     |54       |23        |23         |
|…their welfare and that of Eircom are more closely  |         |          |           |
|linked                                              |42       |20        |38         |
|…they are more important members of Eircom          |         |          |           |
|…greater loyalty/commitment to Eircom               |         |          |           |
|                                                    |         |          |           |
|Mean 3 items                                        |         |          |           |
Notes: employees presented with scale 1 (strongly agree) to 7 (strongly disagree)
* Item scores have been reversed 
Next we examine the mediating factors through which privatisation  and  employee  share-
ownership  influence  changes  in  employee   commitment.    Table   2   presents   the   results   of
multivariate  regressions  used  to   examine   the   relationship   between   changes   in   employee
commitment and perceived changes in working conditions, union management collaboration,  and
operational and strategic participation since privatisation and the introduction of the ESOP[6].  As
the  independent   variables   operational   participation   and   strategic   participation   are   highly
correlated, regressions A and C include operational participation as an independent variable, while
regressions B and  D  include  strategic  participation  as  an  independent  variable.   Standardised
regression coefficients (?) between the variables and the relevant t-statistics are reported.   The  R²
was significant in each regression (? < .001).
Focusing first on changes in the context of privatisation,  regressions  A  and  B  identify  a
significant positive relationship between commitment and changes  in  working  conditions  (S?  =
.248 & .327) and operational participation (S? = .232).  Although relatively weaker, there is also a
statistically significant relationship between  commitment  and  union  management  collaboration
(S? = .094 & .122).  In regression B, strategic participation (S? = .090) is significant, but  is  much
less significant than operational participation.  In both  regression  models,  a  change  in  working
conditions has the strongest impact on commitment.  Overall the  results  indicate  that  employees
who perceive an improvement in their immediate work environment,  namely  their  conditions  of
employment and their level of say in workplace decisions, are more likely to report a greater  level
of commitment to  the  firm.   Departmental/strategic  level  participation  and  management-union
collaboration has a less significant impact on commitment. This may be due to the lack of a  direct
relationship with employees’ immediate work environment.
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|            | |Commitment since           |      |Commitment since ESOP            |  |
|            | |Privatisation              |      |                                 |  |
|            |Regression A      |Regression B     |Regression C     |Regression  D    |
|Gender      |-.022 (-0.566)    |-.018 (-0.434)   |.025 (0.692)     |.032 (0.851)     |
|Tenure      |.055 (1.066)      |.042 (0.798)     |.115 (2.455)*    |.092 (1.856)     |
|Retail      |-.069 (-1.700)    |-.074 (-1.813)   |-.063 (-1.728)   |-.072 (-1.879)   |
|Other       |-.010 (-0.266)    |-.009 (-0.240)   |-.013 (-0.385)   |-.011 (-0.304)   |
|ESOP        |-.011 (-0.227)    |-.012 (-0.242)   |.165 (3.790)***  |.160 (3.453)**   |
|Collab      |.094 (2.049)*     |.122 (2.609)**   |.183 (4.395)***  |.224 (5.154)***  |
|Cond        |.248 (5.843)***   |.327 (8.126)***  |.158 (4.119)***  |.275 (7.325)***  |
|OpPart      |.232 (5.557)***   |-                |.366 (9.686)***  |-                |
|StratPart   |-                 |.090 (2.335)*    |-                |.167 (4.651)***  |
|R²          |.20               |.17              |.35              |.27              |
|F (df)      |19.750(8,639)***  |15.993(8,640)*** |42.350(8,639)*** |30.311(8,639)*** |
Dependent variables: changes in employee commitment since privatisation (PSNCom) and the introduction of the ESOP (ESOPCom), both ranging
from 1 (strongly agree) to 7 (strongly disagree).
Note: *Significant at 0.05, **Significant at 0.01, ***Significant at 0.001
Changes in employee commitment since the introduction  of  the  ESOP  are  examined  in
regressions C and  D.   Again  changes  in  conditions  of  employment  (S?  =  .158  &  .275)  and
employee involvement in  workplace  decision-making  (S?  =  .366)  are  statistically  significant.
However, this time the regressions  also  show  that  changes  in  the  level  of  management-union
collaboration (S? = .183 & .224) and  employee  participation  in  strategic-level  decision-making
(S? = .167) have an equally significant impact.  This may be due  to  the  representative  nature  of
the ESOP which has prompted more formal cooperation between  management  and  trade  unions
and greater union involvement in firm-level decision-making.  As may be expected, it can also  be
seen that ESOP members are more inclined to report increased levels  of  commitment  than  those
who do not participate (S? = .165 & .160).
Overall, it can be seen that perceived changes in conditions of employment  and  employee
operational participation have the most significant impact on  changes  in  employee  commitment
since  both  privatisation  and  the  introduction  of  the  ESOP.   Respondents   who   perceive   an
improvement in conditions of  employment  and  workplace  involvement  may  perceive  a  moral
obligation to reciprocate through great loyalty and commitment to the organisation.  On  the  other
hand, perceived  deterioration  in  either  of  these  variables  can  create  significant  reductions  in
employee commitment.  In the context of  privatisation,  changes  in  management-union  relations
and employee participation at the strategic level appear  to  have  a  significant  (at  5%  level)  but
relatively weak impact on changes in employee commitment, with both measures recording higher
and more significant beta coefficients when considered in light of the ESOP.
These results tend to confirm hypotheses 2 and  3,  which  state  that  a  perceived  increase
(decrease) in working  conditions  or  employee  participation  will  be  associated  with  increased
(decreased) levels of commitment.  Hypothesis 3 that perceived  improvements  (deterioration)  in
levels  of  management-union  collaboration  will  be  associated  with  higher   (lower)   levels   of
commitment is also supported, particularly when associated with the introduction of the ESOP.
Organisation citizen behaviour
Organisational Citizen Behaviour (OCB) refers to an employee’s willingness to put a great
deal of effort into their work, perform duties outside those assigned to them,  and  use  their  skills
and knowledge to help  their  co-workers  (Meyer  and  Allen  1997).   Table  3  reports  employee
responses  regarding  changes  in  OCB  since  privatisation  and  the  introduction  of  the   ESOP.
Overall, a larger proportion of respondents report an increase rather than a decrease in OCB  since
privatisation and the introduction of the ESOP. On average, 50 percent of  respondents  agree  that
OCB  has  increased  since  privatisation,  while  24  percent  disagree.  Similarly,  51   percent   of
respondents report an  increase  in  OCB  since  the  introduction  of  the  ESOP,  compared  to  26
percent disagreeing.  However, there are noteworthy  differences  on  two  of  the  items.  A  larger
proportion of employees report an  increased  willingness  to  work  beyond  their  assigned  duties
since the introduction of the ESOP (64 percent).  This may reflect the ability  of  employee  share-
ownership to create a team culture in the  workplace,  encouraging  employees  to  perform  duties
beyond  contract.   Alternatively  over  63  percent  of  employees  indicated  that  they  felt   more
productive in their work since privatisation, compared to 44 per cent in the context  of  the  ESOP.
One  possible  explanation  for  this  result  is  that  employees  may  associate   changes   in   their
productivity  levels   with   changes   in   their   work   patterns   (e.g.   workload,   teamwork   and
supervision), which are measures introduced in preparing the firm for privatisation.
Table 3 Changes in employee citizen behaviour
|                                              |Agree   |Neither   |Disagree       |
|                                              |(1-3)   |(4)       |(5-7)          |
|Items                                         |%       |%         |%              |
|Since privatisation, employees…               |        |          |               |
|…are willing to put more effort into their    |44      |29        |28             |
|work                                          |43      |30        |27             |
|…are more willing to go beyond their assigned |64      |20        |16             |
|duties                                        |        |          |               |
|… feel more productive in their work than they|50      |26        |24             |
|used to be*                                   |        |          |               |
|                                              |        |          |               |
|Mean percentage 3 items                       |45      |24        |31             |
|                                              |64      |16        |20             |
|Since the ESOP, employees…                    |44      |29        |28             |
|…are more willing to put greater effort into  |        |          |               |
|their work                                    |51      |23        |26             |
|…are more willing to go beyond their assigned |        |          |               |
|duties*                                       |        |          |               |
|…feel more productive in their work than they |        |          |               |
|used to b                                     |        |          |               |
|                                              |        |          |               |
|Mean percentage 3 items                       |        |          |               |
Notes: employees presented with scale 1 (strongly agree) to 7 (strongly disagree)
0
0* Item scores have been reversed 
Compared to our findings in relation to employee commitment, our results fail  to  indicate
a clear difference between how employees perceive changes in their OCB  following  privatisation
as opposed to the introduction of the ESOP.  The results  therefore  fail  to  support  hypothesis  1,
under which it was expected that the ESOP would be associated  with  a  larger  increase  in  OCB
than privatisation.  Although on  average  both  privatisation  and  employee  share-ownership  are
associated  with  an  increase  in  OCB,  the  data  indicates  these  increases  can  be  attributed  to
different factors.  Privatisation creates an increase  in  OCB  through  changes  in  employee  work
patterns, along with an increase  in  individual  employee  workload  arising  from  a  reduction  in
employee numbers.  However,  this  increase  has  not  been  accompanied  by  a  greater  level  of
employee commitment,  which  may  have  been  expected  if  management  had  adopted  a  more
human resource management (HRM) approach.  On  the  other  hand,  employee  share-ownership
has been more successful in improving both employee commitment and OCB,  which  is  reflected
in an increased willingness for employees to work beyond their assigned duties.
Multivariate  analysis  is  again  used  to  examine  the  relationship  between   changes   in
management-union  collaboration,  working  conditions,  operational  participation   and   strategic
participation and changes in OCB[7].  Table  4  shows  the  results  of  the  hierarchical  regression
analysis.  Due to their high level  of  correlation,  separate  analyses  were  again  conducted  using
operational participation and strategic participation as independent variables.
Table 4 Determinants of changes in employee OCB [Standardised Beta coefficients (t-stat)]
|          |OCB since privatisation            |   |OCB since ESOP                  |  |
|        |Regression A       |Regression B       |Regression C       |Regression D     |
|        |                   |                   |                   |                 |
|Gender  |.027 (0.723)       |.031 (0.826)       |.040 (1.141)       |.045 (1.274)     |
|Tenure  |-.071 (-1.442)     |-.073 (-1.466)     |.021 (0.457)       |.016 (0.348)     |
|Retail  |-.026 (-0.689)     |-.030 (-0.791)     |.008 (0.233)       |.002 (0.063)     |
|Other   |-.016 (-0.460)     |-.018 (-0.500)     |.014 (0.438)       |.012 (0.373)     |
|ESOP    |.036 (0.781)       |.044 (0.959)       |.204 (4.828)***    |.215 (4.916)***  |
|Collab  |.223 (5.121)***    |.243 (5.575)***    |.259 (6.421)***    |.288 (7.003)***  |
|Cond    |.268 (6.689)***    |.334 (8.876)***    |.199 (5.338)***    |.291 (8.187)***  |
|OpPart  |.146 (3.708)***    |-                  |.213 (5.799)***    |-                |
|StratPar|-                  |-.003 (-0.094)     |-                  |.010 (0.284)     |
|t       |                   |                   |                   |                 |
|R²      |.287               |.271               |.384               |.352             |
|F  (df) |32.077 (8,639)***  |29.767 (8,640)***  |49.842 (8,639)***  |43.372 (8,639)***|
Dependent variables: Changes in employee citizen behaviour since privatisation (PSNOCB) and the introduction of the ESOP (ESOPOCB), both
ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 7 (strongly disagree).
Note: *Significant at 0.05, **Significant at 0.01, ***Significant at 0.001
Regressions A and B examine the determinants of changes in OCB  in  the  context  of  the
privatisation of Eircom.  A significant positive  relationship  was  found  between  OCB  and  both
conditions of employment (S? = .268 & .334) and management-union collaboration (S? =  .223  &
.243).   Thus  employees  who  perceive  an   improvement   in   management-union   relations   or
conditions of employment are more likely to perceive  an  increase  in  employee  OCB.   There  is
also a positive and significant relationship between OCB and participation at the operational  level
in regression A (S? = .146).  On the other  hand,  there  is  no  statistically  significant  relationship
between OCB and participation at the strategic level (regression B). These findings are  consistent
with those found in the case of employee commitment. However, a notable  difference  is  that  the
level  of  collaboration  between  management  and  trade  unions  has  a   strong   and   significant
association with an increase in OCB, even in the context of privatisation.
Regressions C and D examines the determinants of change in OCB since  the  introduction
of the ESOP.  The results again demonstrates significant and positive coefficients for management-
union collaboration (S? = .259 & .288), working conditions (S? =  .199  &  .291)  and  operational
participation  (S?  =  .213).   Therefore,  similar   to   changes   in   OCB   since   privatisation,   an
improvement  in  management-union  collaboration,   conditions   of   employment   or   employee
involvement in workplace decision-making are associated with increased levels of OCB since  the
introduction of the ESOP.  Furthermore, regression B  shows  that  there  is  again  no  statistically
significant relationship  between  OCB  and  participation  at  the  strategic  level.   It  is  therefore
interesting  to  note  that  while  changes  in  participation  at  the  strategic  level  helps  determine
changes in employee commitment since the introduction of the ESOP, it has no significant  impact
on changes in employee OCB.  Employee membership of the ESOP has no significant  impact  on
changes in employee OCB since privatisation  but  it  has  a  statistically  significant  and  positive
relationship with changes in OCB since the introduction of the ESOP (S? = .204).
These results provide support for hypotheses 2 and 3 that  changes  in  working  conditions
and operational participation are positively associated  with  OCB.   The  significant  and  positive
relationship  between  perceptions  of  management-union  collaboration  and  OCB  both   in   the
context of privatization and the ESOP confirms hypothesis 4.
Conclusions
Extant privatisation literature has largely focused  on  examining  changes  in
firm objectives and strategy, but has paid significantly less attention to changes  that  occur  below
the managerial-level.  The purpose of this paper is to address this issue by exploring  changes  that
occur at  the  operational-level.   More  specifically,  it  examines  the  mechanism  through  which
privatisation and an ESOP affect employee commitment and citizenship  behaviour.  The  changes
associated with  privatisation  and  employee  share-ownership  were  expected  to  have  opposing
outcomes for employee attitudes and behaviour.  Privatisation  was  predicted  to  increase  agency
costs and result in  lower  employee  commitment  and  citizenship  behaviour.   Alternatively,  the
ESOP was expected to reduce agency costs and have a positive impact on  employee  commitment
0
0and citizenship behaviour.
Four  hypotheses  were   tested.   The   first   predicted   that   employee’s   perceptions   of
commitment and citizenship behaviour would be more positive when linked  to  the  establishment
of the ESOP rather than privatisation. This  was  partially  confirmed.  Although  there  was  not  a
marked increase in  overall  employee  commitment,  a  larger  proportion  of  employees  reported
increased levels of organisational integration, involvement, and commitment in the context  of  the
ESOP rather than privatisation. In this regard it is worth noting that despite a 40 percent  reduction
in total employment in  the  six  years  after  privatisation,  this  has  not  been  accompanied  by  a
marked increase in labour turnover. Our survey results indicate that average tenure of employment
remains high at 26.4 years and 85.6 percent  of  respondents  have  remained  with  the  firm  since
privatisation.
Results  indicated   a   more   significant   increase   in   employee   citizenship   behaviour.
However, when respondents were asked to distinguish between the impact of privatisation and the
ESOP there was little  difference  in  employee  perceptions  of  change  in  citizenship  behaviour.
Three further hypotheses were tested to examine the role played by changes  in  employees’  work
environment as antecedents for  commitment  and  citizenship  behaviour.   Perceived  changes  in
working conditions, employee participation, and management-union collaboration were  predicted
to be positively associated with commitment and citizen behaviour.  Results provided  support  for
each of the hypotheses.  In the case of Eircom, a perceived deterioration in working conditions has
resulted in lower levels of commitment  and  citizenship  behaviour,  while  an  increased  level  of
management-union collaboration has  resulted  in  higher  levels  of  commitment  and  citizenship
behaviour.  Findings also indicate that while employee participation at the operational  level  plays
a  significant  role  in  determining  commitment  and  citizenship  behaviour,  participation  at  the
departmental or strategic level has a relatively limited impact.  Although findings indicate that  the
ESOP had a positive effect in terms of moderating the largely negative impact of  privatisation  on
employee commitment,  this  moderating  effect  was  not  strong.   While  a  larger  proportion  of
respondents reported an improvement in their level of commitment since  the  introduction  of  the
ESOP compared to privatisation, the impact of share-ownership on overall employee commitment
is limited.
These  findings  are  broadly  consistent  with  the   available   evidence   concerning   firm
performance.  For example, our findings of increased citizen behaviour following privatisation are
consistent with Palcic  (2008)  who  concludes  that  labour  productivity  grew  by  an  impressive
annual average of 7.8 percent between 2002 and 2005.  Our findings  however  suggest  that  these
improvements cannot be explained by increased  levels  of  organisational  commitment.   Instead,
improved productivity  is  attributable  to  reductions  in  the  size  of  the  labour  force,  increased
workloads and more flexible work practices.
Overall, our findings lead us to the unexpected conclusion that the largest known ESOP  in
the context of privatisation worldwide has failed to significantly impact on employee attitudes and
behaviour.  The Eircom ESOP has provided  a  basis  for  workers  to  accrue  financial  returns  in
exchange for acceptance of changes to the employee relationship in  the  context  of  privatisation.
However, it has failed to create a greater sense of ownership or control among  employees.   These
findings are consistent with the findings from other studies on employee share-ownership (see  for
example Freeman, et al. 2004; Gittell, et al.  2004;  Kruse,  et  al.  2004;  Pendleton,  et  al.  1998).
Although speculative we suggest two possible explanations for these findings.  First, there is  little
evidence that the Eircom ESOP was introduced as a  measure  for  promoting  a  culture  of  direct
employee  participation.   In  fact,  the  terms  of  the  ESOP  and  its   representative   nature   give
employees little direct influence over decisions taken by the ESOP Trust on their behalf.   Second,
the Trust has played a controversial  role  in  determining  the  outcome  of  two  post-privatisation
takeovers of Eircom which have led to a considerable deterioration in the financial structure of the
company.  In particular, the ESOT’s support for the Valentia consortium’s bid for the company  in
2001, resulted in a highly-leveraged takeover of the company  and  a  resultant  exercise  in  value-
extraction with investors accruing more than €0.5  billion  in  dividends.   The  company’s  level  of
debt increased from less than €0.5 billion before privatisation to €2.5 billion following this takeover.
  As  a  consequence  the  post-privatisation   performance   of   the   privatised   utility   has   been
characterised  by  significant  underinvestment  in   Ireland’s   telecommunications   infrastructure.
Mounting debt levels have led to a massive fall in the value of  the  firm.   In  June  2009  the  firm
was the subject of intense takeover speculation with bids of approximately €100 million  submitted.
This compares with a market capitalisation of over €8 billion at the time  of  privatisation  in  1999.
One commentator has argued that  the  Trust’s  focus  on  maximising  financial  returns  has  been
counter to the objectives of the trade-union movement and  the  longer  term  interests  of  its  own
members (Sweeney 2004).  Such views are consistent with the findings of  our  study  and  offer  a
plausible explanation for the relatively weak impact of the ESOP  on  organisational  commitment
following privatisation.
References
Arrowsmith, J. (2003),  ’Post-Privatisation  Industrial  Relations  in  the  UK  Rail  and  Electricity
Industries,’ Industrial Relations Journal, 34 (2): 150-164.
Ben-Ner, A. and Jones, D. C. (1995), ’Employee  Participation,  Ownership,  and  Productivity:  A
Theoretical Framework.,’ Industrial Relations, 34 (4): 532-555.
Bishop,  M.  and  Thompson,  D.  (1992),  ’Privatisation  in  the  UK:  Internal  Organization   and
Productive Efficiency.,’ Annals of Public & Cooperative Economics, 63 (2): 171-199.
Bos, D. (1986), Public Enterprise Economics, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.
Bos, D. (1991), Privatization: A Theoretical Treatment, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Boycko, M., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1996), ’A  Theory  of  Privatisation,’  The  Economic
Journal, 106 (435): 309-319.
Brown, J. D., Earle, J. S. and  Telegdy,  A.  (2006),  ’Does  Privatization  Hurt  Workers?  Lessons
0
0from  Comprehensive  Manufacturing  Firm  Panel  Data   in   Hungary,   Romania,   Russia,   and
Ukraine,’  Budapest  Working  Papers  on  the  Labour  Market   0510,   Institute   of   Economics,
Hungarian Academy of Science
Coyle-Shapiro, J. and Kessler, I.  (2000),  ’Consequences  of  the  Psychological  Contract  for  the
Employment Relationship: A Large Scale Survey.,’ Journal of Management Studies, 37  (7):  903-
931.
Coyle-Shapiro, J. A.-M. and Kessler, I. (2002), ’Exploring Reciprocity Through  the  Lens  of  the
Psychological Contract: Employee and Employer  Perspectives.,’  European  Journal  of  Work  &
Organizational Psychology, 11 (1): 69-86.
Erakovic, L. and  Wilson,  M.  (2006),  ’The  Interaction  of  Market  and  Technology  in  Radical
Transformation: The Case  of  Telecom  New  Zealand,’  International  Journal  of  Public  Sector
Management, 19 (5): 468-489.
Ferner, A. (1998), Government, Managers and Industrial Relations: Public Enterprises  and  their
Political Environment, Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd.
Ferner, A. and Colling, T. (1991),  ’Privatization,  Regulation  and  Industrial  Relations.,’  British
Journal of Industrial Relations, 29 (3): 391-410.
Florio,  M.  (2004),  The  Great  Divestiture:   Evaluating   the   Welfare   Impact   of   the   British
Privatisations 1979-1997, London: The MIT Press.
Freeman, R. B., Kruse, D. and Blasi, J. (2004), ’Monitoring Colleagues at  Work:  Profit  Sharing,
Employee Ownership, Broad-Based Stock  Options  and  Workplace  Performance  in  the  United
States,’ Centre for Economic Performance, CEP Discussion Paper no.647
Gittell, J. H., Von Nordenflycht, A. and Kochan, T. A. (2004), ’Mutual Gains or Zero Sum? Labor
Relations and Firm Performance in the Airline Industry.,’ Industrial  &  Labor  Relations  Review,
57 (2): 163-180.
Gordon,  M.  E.  and  Ladd,  R.  T.  (1990),  ’Dual  Allegiance:   Renewal,   Reconsideration,   and
Recantation.,’ Personnel Psychology, 43 (1): 37-69.
Haskel, J. and Sanchis, A. (1995), ’Privatisation  and  X-inefficiency:  A  Bargaining  Approach.,’
Journal of Industrial Economics, 43 (3): 301-322.
Haskel, J. and Szymanski, S. (1991), ’Privatization  and  Labour  Markets,’  Employment  Institute
Economic Report, 6 (7):
Kay, J. A. (1991), ’Economics and Business.,’ Economic Journal, 101 (404): 57-63.
Kay, J. A. and Thompson, D. J. (1986), ’Privatisation: A  Policy  in  Search  of  a  Rationale,’  The
Economic Journal, 96 (381): 18-32.
Klein, K. (1987), ’Employee Stock Ownership and Employee Attitudes: A Test of Three Models,’
Journal of Applied Psychology, 72 (2): 319-332.
Kruse, D., et al. (2004), ’Motivating Employee-Owners in ESOP Firms: Human Resource Policies
and Company Performance,’ Centre for Economic Performance, CEP Discussion Paper no.658
La Porta, R. and  Lopez-De-Silones,  F.  (1999),  ’The  Benefits  of  Privatization:  Evidence  from
Mexico,’ The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114 (4): 1193-1242.
Long, R. J. (1980), ’Job Attitudes and Organizational Performance Under Employee Ownership.,’
Academy of Management Journal, 23 (4): 726-738.
Martin,  S.  and  Parker,  D.  (1997),  The  Impact  of  Privatisation:   Ownership   and   Corporate
Performance in the UK, London: Routledge.
Megginson, W. L. and Netter, J. M. (2001), ’From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies
on Privatization.,’ Journal of Economic Literature, 39 (2): 321-390.
Meyer, J. P.  and  Allen,  N.  J.  (1997),  Commitment  in  the  Workplace:  Theory,  Research  and
Application, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, Inc.
Mowday, R. T., Porter, L. W. and Steers, R.  M.  (1982),  Employee-Organization  Linkages:  The
Psychology and Commitment, Absenteeism, and Turnover, London: Academic Press Inc.
O’Connell Davidson, J. (1993), Privatization & Employment  Relations:  The  Case  of  the  Water
Industry, London: Mansell Publishing Limited.
Palcic,  D.  (2008),  The  Privatisation  of  State  Owned  Enterprises  in   Ireland:   An   Economic
Analysis. unpublished PhD thesis, University of Limerick, Ireland.
Parker, D. and Martin, S. (1996), ’The Impact of UK  Privatisation  on  Employment,  Profits  and
the Distribution of Business Income,’ Public Money and Management, 16 (1): 31-38.
Pendleton, A. (1994), ’Structural Organization and Labour Management  in  Public  Enterprise:  A
Study of British Rail.,’ Journal of Management Studies, 31 (1): 33-54.
Pendleton, A. (1997), ’The  Evolution  of  Industrial  Relations  in  UK  Nationalized  Industries.,’
British Journal of Industrial Relations, 35 (2): 145-173.
Pendleton, A. (1999), ’Ownership or Competition?  An Evaluation of the Effects  of  Privatization
on Industrial Relations Institutions, Processes and Outcomes,’ Public Administration, 77 (4): 769-
792.
Pendleton,  A.,  Wilson,  N.  and  Wright,  M.  (1998),  ’The   Perception   and   Effects   of   Share
Ownership:  Empirical  Evidence  from  Employee   Buy-Outs.,’   British   Journal   of   Industrial
Relations, 36 (1): 99-124.
Shleifer, A. (1998), ’State Versus Private Ownership.,’ Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12  (4):
133-151.
Sweeney, P. (2004), Selling Out? Privatisation in Ireland, Dublin: tasc at New Island.
Telecom-Éireann, (1995) ’Annual Report and   Accounts  for  the  Year  Ended  30  March  1995’.
Dublin: Bord Telecom Éireann.
Vickers, J. and Yarrow, G. (1988), Privatization: An Economic Analysis, London: The MIT Press.
Vickers, J. and Yarrow, G. (1989), Privatization: An Economic Analysis, London: The MIT Press.
Williamson, O. E., Wachter, M.  L.  and  Harris,  J.  E.  (1975),  ’Understanding  the  Employment
Relation: The Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange.,’ Bell Journal of Economics, 6 (1): 250-279.
0
0Appendix 1: Description of independent variables
Perceived changes in conditions of employment
|                                          |Incr.|Unch.|Decr.|     |     |
|                                          |     |     |     |     |     |
|Items                                     |(1-3)|(4)  |(5-7)|Mean |S.D. |
|                                          |     |%    |     |     |     |
|                                          |%    |     |%    |     |     |
|Security of employment                    |14.2 |30.0 |55.8 |4.86 |1.55 |
|Hours worked per week                     |32.4 |46.8 |20.8 |3.77 |1.40 |
|Availability of overtime                  |16.4 |19.3 |64.3 |5.20 |1.80 |
|Flexibility in hours worked               |28.4 |37.0 |34.7 |4.22 |1.63 |
|Basic pay                                 |12.2 |27.4 |60.5 |5.19 |1.60 |
|Incentives/benefits received (excluding   |15.5 |21.0 |63.5 |5.18 |1.63 |
|ESOP benefits)                            |78.6 |13.4 |8.0  |2.46 |1.45 |
|Workload                                  |46.9 |24.6 |28.6 |3.73 |1.83 |
|Mobility between tasks                    |39.8 |32.0 |28.2 |3.91 |1.65 |
|Level of teamwork                         |13.6 |26.2 |60.2 |5.12 |1.56 |
|Level of training                         |     |     |     |     |     |
Notes: employees presented with scale 1 (increased significantly) to 7 (decreased significantly)
Perceived changes in employee participation
|           |                                      |Incr. |Unch. |Decr. |      |      |
|           |                                      |(1-3) |(4)   |(5-7) |      |      |
|           |Items                                 |%     |%     |%     |Mean  |S.D.  |
|           |Manner in which assigned tasks are    |20.0  |33.9  |46.1  |4.63  |1.60  |
|Operational|completed                             |15.4  |34.5  |50.4  |4.76  |1.47  |
|           |Hours worked                          |17.7  |23.0  |59.3  |5.00  |1.67  |
|           |Level of pay/benefits                 |11.5  |29.7  |57.9  |5.04  |1.47  |
|           |Level of training                     |      |      |      |      |      |
|           |Hiring/dismissal of personnel         |8.4   |27.0  |64.6  |5.33  |1.51  |
|Strategic/ |Promotion/transfer of personnel       |7.9   |26.4  |65.7  |5.38  |1.47  |
|Department |Firm                                  |18.9  |23.1  |58.0  |5.01  |1.83  |
|           |closures/acquisitions/mergers/takeover|17.7  |18.0  |64.3  |5.23  |1.94  |
|           |s                                     |17.7  |22.3  |60.0  |5.13  |1.81  |
|           |Position/salary of senior management  |      |      |      |      |      |
|           |Firm budget/finances                  |      |      |      |      |      |
Notes: employees presented with scale 1 (much more say) to 7 (much less say)
Perceived changes management-union collaboration
|                                                 |Agree |Neith.|Disa. |      |      |
|                                                 |(1-3) |      |(5-7) |      |      |
|Items                                            |%     |(4)   |%     |Mean  |S.D.  |
|                                                 |      |%     |      |      |      |
|Since the establishment of the ESOP unions have  |      |      |      |      |      |
|been more willing to cooperate with management in|      |      |      |      |      |
|solving the problems facing Eircom               |87.6  |6.3   |6.0   |2.10  |1.32  |
|Since privatisation unions have been less willing|      |      |      |      |      |
|to cooperate with management in solving the      |      |      |      |      |      |
|problems facing Eircom                           |10.8  |9.7   |79.5  |4.64  |1.58  |
|Since the establishment of the ESOP management   |      |      |      |      |      |
|have seen cooperation with trade unions as vital |      |      |      |      |      |
|in creating change within Eircom                 |73.4  |10.0  |16.7  |2.75  |1.74  |
|Since privatisation management have put greater  |      |      |      |      |      |
|emphasis on cooperation with trade unions        |46.2  |20.2  |33.6  |3.76  |1.80  |
|Since the establishment of the ESOP              |      |      |      |      |      |
|union-management relations have improved         |66.9  |16.6  |16.5  |3.02  |1.62  |
|significantly                                    |      |      |      |      |      |
|Since privatisation union-management relations   |16.0  |18.2  |65.8  |5.16  |1.67  |
|have deteriorated significantly                  |      |      |      |      |      |
Notes: employees presented with scale 1 (strongly agree) to 7 (strongly disagree)
0
0Appendix 2 Descriptive statistics and correlation between variables
Variables |M* |SD |? |1 |2 |3 |4 |5 |6 |7 |8 |9 |10 |11 |12 | |1 Gender |- |- |- | | | | | | | | | | | | | |2 Tenure |26.4 |10.2 |- |.36 | |
| | | | | | | | | | |3 Retail |- |- |- |-.26 |-.38 | | | | | | | | | | | |4 Other |- |- |- |-.14 |-.04 |-.19 | | | | | | | | | | |5 ESOP |- |- |- |-.11 |-.63 |.28
|.03 | | | | | | | | | |6 Collab |3.3 |1.7 |.86 |-.12 |-.52 |.27 |.09 |.51 | | | | | | | | |7 OpPart |5.1 |1.5 |.89 |.04 |-.18 |.08 |.01 |.22 |.33 |
| | | | | | |8 StratPart |5.7 |1.6 |.88 |.01 |-.07 |.05 |-.03 |.18 |.17 |.60 | | | | | | |9 Cond |4.6 |1.1 |.80 |-.08 |-.18 |.12 |-01 |.21 |.37
|.51 |.31 | | | | | |10 ESOP.Com |4.3 |1.6 |.71 |.01 |-.15 |.04 |.01 |.28 |.36 |.51 |.31 |.42 | | | | |11 ESOP.OCB |3.8 |1.6 |.76 |-
.05 |-.31 |.16 |.04 |.41 |.49 |.44 |.19 |.44 |.64 | | | |12 PSN.Com |5.3 |1.3 |.70 |-.03 |-.06 |-.01 |.01 |.09 |.21 |.37 |.20 |.38 |.49
|.36 | | |13 PSN.OCB |3.7 |1.6 |.78 |-.06 |.26 |.11 |.01 |.27 |.41 |.37 |.15 |.44 |.43 |.67 |.43 | |Note: N = 711, If r ?.08, p < .05; r ?
.12, p < .01; r ? .14, p < .001, *mean values, with the exception of tenure, are based on each measures original seven-point scale
------------------------------------
[1] This research has been part-funded by the Irish Research Council for the Humanities and
Social Sciences (IRCHSS).
[2] Comsource was a consortium of the privatised Dutch telecom KPN and the Swedish state-
owned telecom Telia.  It invested €232 million in Telecom Éireann, in exchange for a 20 percent
shareholding and an option to increase
the???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????†?????????????????????????????????ir
stake by a further 15 percent
[3] Under the 1977 Worker Participation (State Enterprises) Act (reviewed in 1988), employees
have the right to elect a third of all directors of state owned enterprises
[4] Eircom’s core business areas are Retail, Wholesale/Network, and Others.  As
Wholesale/Network accounts for the majority of respondents, it was used as the baseline in
forming the dummy variables
[5] Of the 711 valid responses received, 44 were from employees who are not members of the
ESOP.
[6] PSNCom = ? + ?1(Controls) + ?2(Collab) + ?3(Cond) + ?4(OpPart) + ?5(StratPart) + ?
ESOPCom= ? + ?1(Controls) + ?2(Collab) + ?3(Cond) + ?4(OpPart) + ?5(StratPart) + ?
[7] PSNOCB = ? + ?1(Controls) + ?2(Collab) + ?3(Cond) + ?4(OpPart) + ?5(StratPart) +
?6(PSN.Com) + ?
ESOPOCB= ? + ?1(Controls) + ?2(Collab) + ?3(Cond) + ?4(OpPart) + ?5(StratPart) +
?6(PSN.ESOP) + ?
